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The Determinants of Public Sector Fiscal 
Variations Among Nations 
KIM QUAILE HILL 
University of Houston at Clear Lake City 
and 
GEORGE E. ANTUNES 
University of Houston 
Previous cross-national studies have suggested three primary theo-
retical explanations for public sector fiscal variations: an "institu tional 
development" explanation; a "political effects" view; and an "economic 
effects" hypothesis. Unfortunately, no systematic research has offered an 
empirical test of the relative efficacy of these three views. The present 
article reports such a test. The results of our research offer an interesting 
composite explanation of nation-level public expenditure patterns. Before 
examining the results of our -analysis, however, we will consider briefly 
the theoretical antecedents for this work. 
First , several scholars have argued ,that overall public expenditure 
levels should reflect the "capacity" or institutional development of the 
polity. An early statement of this view is that of Almond and Powell.1 
They suggest that expenditure levels measure the "distributive capacity" 
of a government, and that a principal determinant of government ca-
pacity is the extent of differentiation and specializaiion of the organiza-
tional apparatus of government. Similar implications for the meaning of 
expenditure behavior can be drawn from Huntington's 2 treatment of 
political "institutionalization." He argues that increasing size, scope, com-
plexity , and age of official political structmes indicate increasing "insti-
tutionalization" and, hence, viability. Roughly similar views have been 
offered by Diamant and Blank and Rustow. 3 Based on the preceding 
theoretical discussions, we hypothesize that nations with well-institu-
tionalized political systems should capture a larger proportion of the total 
wealth of the society in the form of governmental expenditures. 
1 Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics: A Develop-
mental Approach ( Boston: Little , Brown, 1966). pp. 198-199. 
2 Samuel P. Huntington , Political Order in Changing Societies ( New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1968). 
a Alfred Diamant and Blanche D. Blank, "Meauring National Bureaucracies: The 
Interaction of Theory and Research," Journal of Comparative Administration 1 ( 1), 
1969, p. 121; and Dankwart A. Rustow, A World of Nations (Washington, D. C.: 
Brookings, 1967), p. 75. 
34 
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Tihe second major perspective on cross-national expenditures, em-
phasizing the importance of regime type or regime ideology is well ar-
ticulated by Groth 4 who argues that it is systematic political differences 
between types of regimes which account for public spending differences 
among nations. Examinations of expenditure differences for democracies 
and communist systems have been provided by Pryor and by Groth and 
Wade.0 Several related studies have compared variations in social wel-
fare policies and expenditures with variations in system democratization, 
usually measured in Western terms. 6 In the same vein, a number of 
scholars !have contrasted the expenditure patterns 0£ military as opposed 
to civilian regimes. 7 
The findings of empirical studies of regime types and expenditure 
levels have been rather diverse. Groth 8 and Groth and Wade 9 have 
found differences between democracies and communist systems they 
attributed to regime type; Pryor 10 did not. Cutright's 11 early findings that 
democratization was associated with spending and policy changes have 
been ohallenged by Jaclanan's 12 more sophisticated analysis of this issue. 
4 Alexander J. Groth, Comparative Politics: A Distributive Approach ( New York: 
Macmillan, 1971 ) . 
5 Frederic Pryor, Public Expenditures in Communist and Capitalist Nations 
(Homewood, ill.: Irwin, 1968); Alexander J. Groth and Larry L. Wade, "Educa-
tional Policy Outcomes in Communist, Democratic and Autocratic Systems." paper 
delivered at the American Political Science Association annual meeting, Los Angeles, 
1970; and Alexander J. Groth and Larry L. Wade, "International Educational Policy 
Outcomes," pp. 11-142 in D. Sidjanski (ed.) Political Decision-Making Processes 
(San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1973). 
6 Phillips Cutright, "Political Structure Economic Development, and National 
Social Security Programs," American JoumJ of Sociology, 70(5), 1965; pp. 537-550; 
Phillips Cutright, "'Inequality': A Cross-National Analysis," American Sociological 
Review, 32( 4), 1967, pp. 562-578; Phillips Cutright, "Income Redistribution: A Cross-
National Analysis," Social Forces, 46(1), 1967, pp. 180-190; and Robert W. Jack-
man, "Political Democracy and Social Equality: A Comparative Analysis," American 
Sociological Review, 39 ( 1). 197 4, pp. 29-45. 
7 Eric A. Nordlinger, "Soldiers in Mufti: The Impact of Military Rule Upon Eco-
nomic and Social Change in the Non-Western States," American Political Science 
Review, LXIV(4), 1970, pp. 1131-1148; Philippe D. Schmitter. "Military Inter-
vention, Political Competitiveness. and Public Policy in Latin America: 1950-1967," 
pp. 425-506 in M. Janowitz and J. von Doom (eds.) On MilitanJ Intervention 
(Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press, 1971); R. D. McKinlay and A. S. Cohan, 
"A Comparative Analysis of the Political and Economic Performance of Military and 
Civilian Regimes," Comparative Politics, 8( 1 ), 1975, pp. 1-30; R. D. McKinlay and 
A. S. Cohan, "Performance and Instability in Military and Nonmilitary Regime Sys-
tems," American Political Science Review 70(3), 1976, pp. 850-864; Robert W. 
Jackman, "Politicians in Uniform: Military Governments and Social Change in the 
Third World," American Political Science Review LXX(4), 1976, pp. 1078-1097. 
8 Comparative Politics: A Distributive Approach. 
9 
"Educational Policy Outcomes . . .;" and "International Educational Policy 
Outcomes ... " 
10 Public Expenditures in Communist and Capitalist Nations. 
11 
"Political Structure, Economic Development . . ." 
12 
"Political Democracy and Social Equality . " 
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The literature on civilian versus military regime spending has gener ally 
argued for significant diHerences in the outputs of such regimes. Nord-
linger 13 and Schmitter 14 found significant differences in the outputs of 
the two. However, McKinlay and Cohan 15 and Jackman's 16 more ex-
tensive analyses of this issue argue that regime type so distinguished 
has no such independent effects. A central difficulty of all this last re-
search is that it only examines spending differences for explicitly civilian 
or military regimes. That is, it does not attempt to account for the general 
influence of the military on public policy, regardless of the character of 
the ruling elite.17 It is the latter issue which our analysis examines. 
A third view of nation expenditures has been that of some economists 
such ,as Gupta 18 and Musgrave 19 who have examined the predictability 
0£ national expenditures on the basis of per capita national income level. 
Their concern is with the so called "rising share" hypothesis that changes 
in per capita income levels should lead to similar changes in expenditure 
levels as a proportion ,of the gross national product. Musgrave's evidence 
bearing on this hypothesis is mixed, with diHerent findings for different 
expenditure measures and for diHerent sets of countries grouped by per 
capita income levels. However, he finds no general relationship between 
per capita income and spending. Furthermore, he observes that the ab-
sence of any such finding may result from his failure to control for the 
influence ofi any noneconomic factors. 
To test the relative and combined explanatory capacity ofi these three 
explanations, we have collected a large body of cross-national data. We 
will describe briefly the character of our empirical measures and the 
hypotheses which will be examined. 
The Data 
The sample for this study includes 79 independent nations at 1965. 
These nations were chosen on the basis of two criteria: a population 
greater than one million and data availability for the larger set of indi-
cators from which the present variables are drawn. This group of 
13 "Soldiers in Mufti . . ." 
14 "Military Intervention, Political Competitiveness and Public Policy.. . ." 
15 "A Comparative Analysis of the Political and Economic Performance . . .," 
and "Performance and Instability in Military and Nonmilitary Reginle Systems." 
16 Robert W. Jackman, "Politicians in Uniform .. . " 
17 Kim Quaile Hill, "Military Role vs. Military Rule: A Research Note on Allo-
cations to Military Activities," Comparative Politics, 11 ( 3), 1979, 371-377. 
18 S. P. Gupta, "Public Expenditure and Economic Development-A Cross-Sec-
tional Analysis." Finanzarchiv 28(1), 1968, pp. 26-41. 
19 Richard Musgrave, Fiscal Systems ( ew Haven: Yale University Press, 
1969), pp. 73-83. 
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countries, which is generally representative of all regions except sub-
Saharan Africa, is listed in the Appendix. 
As dependent variables, we employ several different central govern-
ment expenditure measures. The ratio of total current government ex-
penditures to the GNP is employed as an index of the overall size of the 
public sector. As measures of the character of government spending by 
functional categories, we utilize spending in three specific areas opera-
tionalized in both of two ways. First, we have measures of total current 
public spending on education, on health and welfare, and on military 
goods and services as proportions of the GNP. Second, we examine the 
proportions of total government spending devoted to the same three 
functional categories. 
Most of our spending data were derived from the United Nations 
year book of National Accounts Statistics. 20 Missing data were filled in 
from such supplemental sources as national yearbooks, central bank re-
ports, and descriptive case studies. Our GNP data came from Taylor and 
Hudson.21 As a check against gross errors, our expenditure figures were 
compared to available budget data, and the military spending data were 
further compared with Stockholm International Peace Research Insti-
tute 22 figures. As a further test of the reliability of these variables, we 
correlated the absolute expenditure figures for education and for military 
purposes with the comparable data in the 1972 Taylor and Hudson 
W orul Handbook. The latter data were gathered entirely independently 
from our own and provide the only other single source for such figures. 
(The Worul Handbook does not include data on total government spend-
ing or on health and welfare spending. ) The intercorrelations between 
the comparable spending measures for both sets were quite satisfactory; 
all the product moment con-elations exceeded 0.99. 
Our independent variables were operationalized as follows. For the 
concept "political institutionalization" or bureaucratization, we employ 
two measures: The date of independence of the nation and the number 
of government ministries in the central government. Both of these 
variables are drawn from the World Handbook. The first is one proposed 
explicitly by Huntington. 23 We recognize that rthese are weak operation-
alizations of a very abstract theoretical construct. However, we feel that 
20 ( New York: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
1969). 
21 Charles Lewis Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, World Handbook af Political 
and Social Indicators (New Haven: Yale University Press, second edition, 1972). 
22 Yearbook af World Armaments and Disarmaments, 1968/ 1969 (New York: 
Humanities Press, 1969). 
23 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies. 
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the hypothesized relationship is so important that even a weak test is 
warranted. 
For the general concept of regime ideology, we employ two distinct 
measures. One of these is a Socialist Ideology Index, a judgmental scale 
for rthe period 1945-1965 based on the criteria of Anderson, von der 
Mehden, and Young.24 The 4 point ordinal scale ranges from completely 
non-socialist nations to those characterized by "Militant, Mobilization 
Socialism." Scores on this variable for most of the developing nations in 
our sample were taken from Anderson, von der Mehden, and Young; the 
remainder were coded by the authors. 
The second ideology measure is an index of "Regime Coerciveness-
Openness." The values on this index are factor scores from a single fac-
tored principal components solution derived from a set of regime charac-
teristics measuring democratic process and regime ideology variations. 
The individual variables were an Index of Legislative P,arty Fractionali-
zation from Rae, 25 an Index of Press Freedom from the University of 
Missouri Freedom of Information Center, 26 an Index of Electoral Sta-
bility from the 1972 World Handbook, and a communist regime dummy 
variable. The associations of the individual variables with the resultant 
single dimension indicate that higher legislative fractionalization corvarys 
with greater press freedom, more competitive and free elections, and 
non-communist regimes. Consequently, the factor scores from this dimen-
sion provide a composite index of regime orientation. 27 
As a measure of the importance of the military, we include an index 
of the proportion of the working age population in the military. This 
variable is taken from Russett, et al. 28 This particular measure, rather 
than an index of military versus civilian control ofi formal political insti-
tutions, is utilized in order to assess the general influence of the military 
in politics rather than simply their appropriation of political control. 
In addition to the preceding measures based on the three primary 
theoretical perspectives to be tested, we include in our analysis three 
24 Charles Anderson, Fred von der Mehden, and Crawford Young, Issues af 
Political Development ( Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967). 
25 Douglas Rae, The Political Consequences af Electoral Laws ( New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1967). 
26 School of Journalism, University of Missouri at Columbia, "Wor ld Press 
Freedom, 1966," Freedom of Information Center Report No. 181. 
27 The factor loadings on this single dimension were: Legislative Fractionaliza-
tion, -0.83; Press Freedom, -0.92; Electoral Stability, -0.78; and the communist 
regime dummy variable, 0.75. The eigenvalue was 2.71. 
28 Bruce M. Russett, H. R. Alker, Karl W. Deutsch, and Harold D. Lasswell, 
World Handbook af Political and Social Indicators (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1964). 
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control variables. The latter include: ( 1) ,an index of ethnic cleavage ,29 
( 2) population size, and ( 3) population density. The first of these 
variables allows us to control for possible effects of divisive ethnic 
politics on public policy. The last two measure social traits of the 
character of given populations which may also independently influence 
public expenditure patterns. 
In the analysis below we will first examine the bivariate associations 
between our expenditure measures and the hypothetically important in-
dependent variables. Then we will examine the relative importance of 
individual independent variables by means of multiple regression an-
alysis. 30 
Associations with Spending a,s a Proportion of Gross National Product 
In this section we examine the correlates of various spending mea-
sures as a proportion of gross national product. Table 1 presents the 
bivariate Pearsonian correlations with these expenditure variables. If 
one surveys the results in that table, ,almost all of the expenditure variables 
have a moderate ,association in the appropriate direction with an in-
stitutionalization, an ideology, and an economic wealth independent 
variable. 
29 The social cleavage index is a composite measure based on the factor scores 
on the single principal component derived from the factor analysis of three measures 
of this concept. The original variables and their factor loadings were indices of Group 
Discrimination ( 0.73) , Separatist Potential ( 0.75), and Ethnolinguistic Fractionali-
zation (0.88). The first two of these were taken from Ted Gurr, New Error-Com,. 
pensated Measures for Comparing Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Center 
of International Studies, 1966). The third variable was taken from the second 
edition of the World Handbook of Political, and Social Indicators. 
ao We should note at this point two additional observations about our treat-
ment and interpretation of the data. First, we have transformed via logarithms all those 
variables with extremely skewed distributions in order to make them more suitable for 
regression analysis. The variables so transformed are population, population density, 
gross national product per capita, the number of government ministries, and military 
personnel per capita. Second, we also considered the extent of intercorrelation among 
our independent variables-a potential problem which could threaten our ability to 
make inferences about the relative importance of different independent variables. 
However, those associations are generally quite low and appear to pose no such 
difficulty. The average Pearsonion r among our independent variables was 0.17. The 
highest r was 0.51 between population and the number of government ministries. 
40 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
TABLE 1 
Bivariate Associations with Expenditure 
Measures as a Proportion of GNP 
Total Edu.cation Health & W elf . Military 
Expenditures/ Expenditures/ Expenditur es/ Expenditures/ 
Independent Variables GNP GNP GNP GNP 
o. of government 
ministries . . . . . . . . . . . . .43 
Date of Ind ependence . . . .11 
Socialist Ideology . . . . . . . . .34 
"Openness-Coerciveness" 
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29 
Military Personnel/c apita . . . 17 
GNP/ capita .......... ... 34 
Population . . . . . . . . . . . . . .09 
Population density ....... -.14 
Social Cleavage Index .... -.14 
.31 
.03 
.23 
.09 
.21 
.40 
-.08 
-.24 
-.15 
.21 
-.08 
.32 
.13 
.16 
.55 
-.13 
.02 
-.19 
.36 
.07 
.22 
.25 
.38 
.05 
.19 
-.08 
.10 
For the total spending / G P measure four of the correlations are of 
notable magnitude. Size of the governmental establishment has the 
highest Pearsonian r, indicating that political institutionalization as mea-
sured by this variable is an important correlate of the size of the public 
sector. Other especially prominent associations are those for GNP/ capita, 
Socialist Ideology, and the "Openness-Coerciveness" Index. This last 
variable indicates that communistic systems and those with less fraction-
alized legislatures and more coercive characteristics have higher public 
spending to national wealth ratios. The remaining independent variables 
are only weakly correlated wtih the total spending index. 
For the categorical spending variables, the associations are genera lly 
a bit weaker. Yet, in every case at least two independent variables have 
moderate correlations as hypotihesized. For education spending , per capita 
wealth and size of the government bureaucracy are the best correlated 
variables. Also, Socialist Ideology has a moderate correlation in the ap-
propriate direction. The negative relationship with population density 
suggests that there may be some spending economies associated with 
more densely settled populations. 
For health and welfare spending, per capita wealth is the best as-
sociated variable , indeed, this is the strongest correlation in the entire 
table. Socialist Ideology and size of the bureaucracy also have moderate 
associations in the expected direction. 
The militru.y spending measure is best explained by the military 
personnel index, size of the bureaucracy, and the regime coerciveness 
measur e. Interestingly, Socialist Ideology is positively associated with 
military expenditure / GNP while per capita wealth is virtually unasso-
ciated with that dependent variable. 
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If we survey all the results in T,a,ble 1, size of .the bureaucracy, 
wealth, and Socialist Ideology iare the most potent independent variables. 
'I'bus, all three of the principal theoretical perspectives are given some 
support by these ,bivariate resu1~. But other variables also are prominent 
with some individual spending measures, indicating the appropriate-
ness of separate theoretical explanations for each. It should also be noted 
that age of national institutions and population size were virtually incon-
sequential explanatory variables, and population density was prominent 
only in regard to educational spending. Also, while the Social Cleavage 
Index indicated that spending of all kinds was slightly lower in more 
divided societies, the variance shared with this variable was very low in 
every case. 
Because none of the preceding correlational results was particularly 
large in absolute magnitude of the r2, it is probable that a multivariate 
explanation is needed to account for any sizable portion of the variation 
in spending levels. In Oil"der to explore such an avenue, we fitted full 
multiple regressions to our spending variables employing all of the 
independent variables discussed above save age of the national institu-
tions. These multiple regression results are reported in Table 2. 
The regressions are reasonably successful with approximately 40 
percent variance explained in three of the four cases. For military 
spending the explained variance falls to 29 percent. Across all these 
regressions, the most prominent explanatory variables are size of the 
bureaucl'acy, wealth per capita and Regime Coerciveness-Openness. Yet, 
other independent variables are important for some of the spending 
measures. 
In fact, the results in T,able 2 support different explanatory rationales 
for each of the four dependent variables. For example, the overall size 
of public sector spending ( as measured by total spending/ GNP) is a 
function of several variables including wealth, bureaucratization, poli-
tical regime characteristics, and even population density to a lesser 
extent. Thus, there is no single predominant explanation for variations 
in the "scope of governmental authority." Instead, a variety of forces 
can operate to increase the size of the public sector. It may be that a 
single characteristic like wealth or ideology might determine whether a 
particular nation has an especially high or especially low total spending 
ratio. However, these cross-sectional results indicate that no one of the 
independent variables we examined could be called a general explana-
tion for differences in the size of the public sector. 
Educational spending variations, on the other hand, are shown in 
Table 2 to be largely a function of wealth and of size of the bureau-
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TABLE 2 
Multiple Regressions with Expenditure Measures as a Proportion of GNp 
Expenditure 
Measure 
Total Spending 
as Pct. GNP 
Education 
Spending as 
Pct GNP 
Health and 
Welfare 
Spending as 
Pct. GNP 
Military 
Spending as 
Pct. GNP 
Independent Regression 
Variable C oefjicient 
Govt. Ministries ......... .092 
GNP/ cap ............... .042 
Socialist Ideology . . . . . . . . .007 
Coerciveness-Openness .040 
Military Personnel/cap. . .. -.011 
Population Density ....... -.018 
Population .... . ......... -.003 
Social Cleavage Index .. . . -.016 
(constant) ........ . . -.234 
Govt. Ministries ..... .. .. .012 
G P/ cap . . ............. .006 
Socialist Ideology .. . ..... .001 
Coerciveness-Openness ... . 002 
Military Personnel/cap. . . . .0003 
Population Density ..... . . -.003 
Population .. . ........... -.002 
Social Cleavage Index .... -.002 
(constant) ..... . .. . . -.013 
Govt . Ministries .... . .... .006 
G P/cap ............... .023 
Socialist Ideology . . .. . . . . .003 
Coerciveness-Openness .012 
Military Personnel/cap . ... -.006 
Population Density . .. ... -.0004 
Population ..... . .. . ..... -.002 
Social Cleavage Index .... -.002 
(constant) ......... -.121 
Govt. Ministries .. . ..... . .013 
G P/cap .. . ....... -.001 
Socialist Ideology . . . . . . . . .002 
Coerciveness-Openness .001 
Military Personnel/cap. . . . .009 
Population Density ....... - .002 
Population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .001 
Social Cleavage Index . . . . .002 
(constant) .......... . 004 
Standard Standardized 
--Error Coefficient R R• 
.032 .335 
-
.013 .376 
.009 .080 
.013 .336 
.012 -.094 
.009 -.201 
.010 -.034 
0.12 -.135 0.65 0.42 
.005 .306 
.002 .359 
.001 .082 
.002 .132 
.002 .020 
.001 -.262 
.001 -.158 
.002 - .088 0.60 0.36 
.011 .067 
.004 .644 
.003 .123 
.004 .308 
.004 -.157 
.003 -.013 
.003 -.064 
.004 -.048 0.66 0.43 
.007 .237 
.003 -.066 
.002 .093 
.003 .056 
.003 .387 
.002 -.132 
.002 .042 
.003 .099 0.54 0.29 
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cracy. Thus, political and ideological differences among nations are not 
important in their influence on this variable. The negative influence of 
population density probably reflects a special characteristic of educa-
tional public service facilities. Schools, perhaps more than any other 
kind of service facility, must be geographically proximate to client popu-
lations. Less dense populations must build a greater number of facilities 
in order to achieve acceptable accessability. In addition, there is little 
substitutibility across different kinds of elucational institutions. An 
elementary school cannot substitute for a high school the way a health 
clinic often can for a hospital. Thus, it is plausible that population 
density has a greater negative influence on education spending than on 
military or health and welfare allocations. 31 
For health spending the predominant explanatory variable is per 
capita wealth. This finding suggests that health and welfare activities 
may be a "surplus" governmental phenomenon. Only after more essen-
tial services have been provided or higher priority needs met will such 
spending rise. Thus, it is essentially wealth variations rather than polit-
ical or institutional ones which dete1mine health and welfare spending. 
The only qualillcation to this view arises from the important but weaker 
influence of Regime Coerciveness. This probably reflects the great con-
cern of communist societies with population health levels. While it is 
important, this influence is certainly secondary to that with wealth levels. 
For military spending yet another rational is indicated by our results. 
Our empirical results indicate that neither wealth nor domestic political 
variations are related to military spending variations. In fact, our ability 
to account for military spending variations was comparatively weak. 
These results indicate that military spending is an important priority 
for diverse kinds of polities-rich, poor, competitive, coercive, and so on. 
Evidently, domestic political and social characteristics of nations have 
only limited independent capacity to explain military spending varia-
tions. One important reason for this finding, of course, lies in the special 
prominence of internation influences on military expenditure levels.82 
Associations with Categorical Spending Levels as Proportions of the 
Total Budget 
In this section we examine a somewhat different dimension of public 
fiscal behavior-the correlates of categorical spending as a proportion of 
Sl For within-nation evidence supporting this view see Kim Quaile Hill, "The 
Within-Nation Disbibution of Public Expenditures and Services," American Journal 
of Political Science XX(2), 1976, pp. 303-318. 
32 On this point, see Kim Quaile Hill , "Domestic Politics, International Linkages, 
and Military Expenditure Levels," Studies in Comparative lntemational Development 
XIII.I) 1978, pp. 38-59. 
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total spending. That is, we examine here allocations within the total 
budget package as opposed to categorical allocations relative to total 
societal wealth. Budgetary allocations reflect the importance of different 
activities as a portion of all government activities, whereas spending 
proportionate to GNP reflects the importance of governmental activities 
relative to gross societal resources. The empirical results we obtain in 
this section are somewhat different from those in the preceding analysis. 
After explaining the present findings, we will explicate the broader 
meaning of both analytic approaches. 
In table 3 we present the bivariate associations among our various 
independent variables and the three categorical spending measures as a 
proportion of total expenditures. The most striking aspect of these 
correlations is their generally low magnitude. 
TABLE 3 
Bivariate Associations with Categorical Spending Measures as a 
Proportion of Total Expenditures 
Education 
Expend4tures/ 
Independent Variables Total Spending 
No. of govt. ministries ........ . -.06 
Date of Independence ... . .. . ........ -.12 
Socialist Ideology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .03 
"Openness-Coerciveness" Index ....... -.15 
Military PersonneVCapita . . . . . . . . . . . . .05 
GNP/ capita . .. . .. . .. .. . . . . ......... . 15 
Population ... . .... . ....... . ........ -.27 
Population density .. .. .. . .. . ... .. . . . -.20 
Social Cleavage Index . . ..... . .. . .. .. -.ITT 
Health & Welf. 
Expenditures/ 
Total Spending 
.03 
-.19 
.21 
-.05 
.10 
.55 
-.15 
.05 
-.22 
Military 
Expenditures/ 
Total Spending 
-.01 
-.01 
.06 
.14 
.18 
-.17 
.09 
.02 
.11 
For education spending the largest associations are the negative 
ones with population size and density. Per capita wealth has a slight 
positive influence and regime coerciveness a similar negative one on this 
dependent variable. Yet, none of these variables shares as much as 10 
percent common variation with the educational spending measure. 
The health and welfare variable exhibits the only truly sizable 
association in the table-that with per capita wealth, the two variables 
sharing about 30 percent common variance. Socialist Ideology has a 
lesser positive association here, while the Social Cleavage Index and 
Date of Independence have slight negative associations with health 
spending. 
The military spending measure demonstrates the weakest associa-
tions of all three dependent variables in Table 3. It's highest r is the 
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o.18 with military personnel per capita. GNP per capita has a negative 
association of comparable magnitude and regime coerciveness a slight 
positive association. As with the two other categorical spending measures 
in Table 3, many of these findings are in the hypothesized direction; 
yet, most are of inconsequential magnitude. 
Given the weak bivariate results in Table 3 we examined multiple 
regression results for the same dependent variables in hopes that a 
multivruiate model would better account for spending variations. Em-
ploying all the independent variables in Table 3, we were only able 
to explain 13 percent of the variation in education spending •and 12 per-
cent of that in military spending. Because the fit of these models was so 
poor, we have not reproduced the results in a separate table. They add 
nothing significant to our understanding beyond the bivariate results 
repoited above. 
In the multiple regression model with health and welfare spending 
as a percentage of total government spending 35 percent of the variance 
in health spending is accounted for. Yet, 30 percent of the total variance 
is explained by the positive influence of per capita wealth alone, and 
no other variable has a significant independent influence on health spend-
ing. 
On first glance, the results in this section appear disappointingly 
weak and difficult to assimilate with those of the preceding analysis. 
While the association of many of our independent variables with cate-
gorical budgetary allocations is in the hypothesized direction, in most 
cases the magnitude of the relationship is very weak. In shoit, we can-
not account well for variations in such budgetary ·allocations on the basis 
of this rather diverse set of independent variables. In order to under-
stand the meaning of these findings we must incorporate them with 
those of the preceding section, taking account of the different substan-
tive meanings of our dependent variables. 
Conclusions 
In order to provide an adequate summary explanation of our results, 
we must examine separately the results for the policy area of education, 
health and welfare, and the military. These explanations should also 
provide some theoretical linkage for the different multivariate results 
for each of our two spending measures in each policy area. Additionally, 
we must incorporate in ,these explanations the influence of thos·e control 
variables which, although they were not included in our three primary 
hypotheses, were also considered as plausible explanatory variables. 
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In the area of education our results show that wealth and govern-
mental institutionalization best account for spending relative to the 
G P. None of our primary independent variables bas much of an in-
fluence , however, on education spending as a proportion of total spending. 
On the average, then, rich and poor nations spend a roughly compar able 
portion of their budget on education, but a wealth effect associated with 
higher per capita GNP allows the wealthier nations to devote larger 
p01tions of total societal resources to this area. Finally, none of our 
other predictors indicates impoitant conditions under which the rela tive 
budgetary priority of education would change. At best, the correlates 
of that variable in Table 3 reflect a slight economy of scale associated 
with larger and more densely settled populations . This finding agrees 
with om earlier discussion of the relatively unique locational impera-
tives which constrain the disposition of educational capital. 
When we tum to om various results for health and welfare spend-
ing, the situation changes . Initially, we determined that health expendi-
tures relative to the GNP were predominately a function of per capita 
wealth and to a lesser extent regime coerciveness. Only per capita 
wealth had a sizable independent influence on the proportion of the 
budget devoted to health and welfare expenditures. The strong relation-
ship of per capita GNP to health spending as a portion of GNP suggests 
what we termed above a wealth effect. As in the case of education, 
wealthier societies devote a larger portion of total resources to this 
policy area. The second finding with health spending as a porti on of 
the total budget indicates a wealth-related priorities effect. Thus, 
wealthier societies also accord health ,and welfare a greater priority 
related to all other governmental activities, and health and welfare 
policies receive the benefits of two distinct kinds of allocational chan ges 
associated with increasing national wealth. The combination of these 
two influences is unique to this policy area among the three examined 
here. 
In the case of military spending we also have a distinct set of 
findings explainable in issue-specific terms. Our initial results with 
spending relative to the GNP were that the size of the military establish-
ment ,and, more weakly, the institutionalization of the governme ntal 
bureaucracy were impoitant independent predictors. Yet, we were not 
able to account for as much of the variation in military spending/ GNP 
as we were with education ,and health. Furthermore, our correlations 
with military spending as a portion of total spending were especially 
weak. Surprisingly even the size of the military establishment had only 
a slight positive effect on this variable . All these findings sugge st that, 
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compared to the other categorical spending measures, military alloca-
tions are relatively less explainable by the nation attributes analyzed 
here. Especially noteworthy are the findings that neither wealth nor 
regime ideology differences account for military spending variations. 
Thus, various kinds of nations-rich, poor, coercive, competitive-have 
fairly similar military spending priorities on average. This generalization 
is appropriate for both of the ways in which we have examined govern-
mental priorities. 
Finally, om analysis for the size of the public sector ( total spend-
ing/ GNP ) indicated several independent variables that have unique 
effects upon that spending measure. Richer nations, those with more 
institutionalized political systems and those with more coercive and 
"closed" political systems tended to have larger government budgets 
relative to their societal wealth. Yet, none of these influences on total 
spending overwhelms the others in explanatory capacity. A multivariate 
model is necessary to account for any signillcant portion of total spend-
ing variations, and a substantial amount of total variance remains un-
explained nonetheless. 
Generalizing beyond the specific results of our empirical analyses, 
some broader conclusions are also indicated. First, we have shown that 
all three of these separate theoretical perspectives discussed in our intro-
duction have some validity. In the terms of recent debate over the 
determinants of spending levels for other units of analysis, political, 
social, and economic infrastructme variables all have unique influences 
on some kinds of spending variations. 
Despite the preceding conclusion, our results also indicate that 
broad theoretical perspectives have only limited explanatory capacity 
in this area. Our statistical analyses based on these perspectives could 
only account for moderate proportions of the expenditure variations 
among nations, even in the best cases. These results indicate that con-
siderable theoretical work is needed to identify more potent explanatory 
models. 
It would appear that a final aspect of •our own work points to the 
major direction which future research should pursue. Our discussions 
of categorical expenditme variations suggest that issue specific explana-
tions are necessary to account for allocational differences within given 
policy areas. Thus, future research will likely profit from less concern 
with aggregate public spending and greater attention to the unique 
policy problems, priorities, and constraints of implementation associated 
with specific issue areas. 
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APPENDIX 
List of Nations Included in the Study 
01 Afghanistan 41 Japan 
02 Argentina 42 Jordan 
03 Australia 43 Lebanon 
04 Austria 44 Liberia 
05 Belgium 45 Libya 
06 Bolivia 46 Malaysia 
07 Brazil 47 Mexico 
08 Bulgaria 48 Morocco 
09 Burma 49 Netherlands 
10 Cambodia 50 New Zealand 
11 Canada 51 Nicaragua 
12 Ceylon 52 Norway 
13 Chile 53 Pakistan 
14 China Mainland 54 Panama 
15 China Taiwan 55 Paraguay 
16 Colombia 56 Peru 
17 Costa Rica 57 Philiptnes 
18 Cuba 58 Polan 
19 Czechoslovakia 59 Portugal 
20 Denmark 60 Romania 
21 Dominican Republic 61 Saudi Arabia 
22 East Germany 62 South Africa 
23 Ecuador 63 South Korea 
24 El Salvador 64 Spain 
25 Ethiopia 65 Sudan 
26 Finland 66 Sweden 
27 France 67 Switzerland 
28 Ghana 68 Syria 
29 Greece 69 Thailand 
30 Guatemala 70 Tunisia 
31 Haiti 71 Turkey 
32 Honduras 72 UAR 
33 Hungary 73 United Kingdom 
34 India 74 Uruguay 
35 Indonesia 75 USA 
36 Iran 76 USSR 
37 Iraq 77 Venezuela 
38 Ireland 78 West Germany 
39 Israel 79 Yugoslavia 
40 Italy 
